Understanding American health-care and health-care reform
Widespread corporate SusplClon, and sluggish governmental progress were factors stalling the USA health-care reform process, as Johnson states (November 1995, jRSM, pp 652P-656P) . There were also other factors.
First, Americans rarely believe that a generalist m~be best, either alone or making a referral. HMOs are having to change this fun~amental attitude, possibly a harder job than financial restructuring.
Secondly, the health care reform proposal, led by Mrs Clinton, was to create huge, multiagencybureaucracies(somewhat reminiscent of the UK where administrators have multiplied whilst hospital bedspacc has contracted). The sluggish pace (an extended period needed to educate the team) and the inelegant proposal were probably related to a team inexperienced in this area. Meanwhile, Mr Clinton's political opposition (who have undergone a renaissance during the last 2 years) were broadcasting an anti-bureaucracy message, usingthe health-care proposal as an example.
Big contrasts between American and English hospitals are aesthetic or logistical, not technical. Operating rooms in the USA do not have the typical UK list of 8-10 patients, day-in and day-out; fixed costs are thus assigned over fewer cases. Tangential, 'hotel' services overwhelm the cost of technical services (drugs, clinical staff, ctc.) of hospitals in the USA today. Pharmacoeconomic and health care utilization improvements cannot identify sufficient reduction in total health care costs. American hospitals spend a lot of money on decoration. Ex-servicemen (of whom many are now of the ageing, 'baby-boom' generation) using the Veterans' Admininstration, are often ignored in this debate, and their hospitals look much more like those operated by the NHS.
The Janet Nash Travelling Fellowship, Johnson and Haranden (January 1994 JRSM, pp 47-49) are to be congratulated. If we are to understand and make progress in health care delivery in any country of the world, then we need perspectives such as these, from other countries, to help us form our ideas.
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Population strategy for preventive medicine
Dr Bruce Charlton's critique of Geoffrey Rose's population strategy for preventive medicine (November 1995 jRSM, pp 607-610) endorses the attitude of many academic medical investigators, who depreciate theories of multiple causation of disease based on epidemiology as ignorant, and insist that preventive measures must await full elucidation of a complete causal chain, identifying the single necessary cause.
As a houseman at the Brompton Hospital [ dined from an endowed kitchen because the founding benefactors recognized good nutrition as a preventive measure against consumption, and did not wait another 40 years for Koch's discovery of the tubercle bacillus. The discovery of this single, necessary cause had no impact on the mortality trends from tuberculosis, which continued their steady decline for another 70 years until the advent of antibiotics, responding to public health measures and improving living conditions. In Britainin the 19305more children's lives were lost, compared with other countries, because academic debate delayed the introduction of immunization with diphtheria toxoid. Should we have waited another 40 years, until the necessary cause of the diphtheria bacillus' virulence was shown to be its infection with a bacteriophage? Who blows the whistle when the cause is definitely proven? Dr Charlton's article was published in the week it was announced that the public campaign to put infants to sleep on their backs had resulted in a 75% reduction in sudden infant deaths, Does Dr Charlton want to undo this advice because the Single necessary cause is not known, and the disease is only at what he sees as the pnmltlve multiple risk factor stage of epidemiology, rather than that of true scientific understanding?
Governments are not the mindless bullies that he presumes. They respond to public pressure, and can only get away with what the public accepts~a public which is , increasingly reluctant to have its life-style, environment and diseases determined purely by the operation of a free market, and which would like a public health interest at the centre of decision making.
Hippocrates' aphorism 'first do no harm' certainly applies to public health as well as clinical medicine, but the decision to do nothing can be more dangerous than a pragmatic judgement made in the light of partial evidence. In politics, business and war, insisting on doing nothing until you understand everything is a recipe for failure. The same is true in public health even though a perfectionist approach may be attractive to philosophers, theorists and ethicists.
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Ocular and renal sarcoidosis
It would be wrong if the message in the case report of Shah and colleagues (October 1995 jRSM, pp 597-598) were accepted uncritically. Granulomatous interstitial nephritis due to sarcoidosis, with or without eye involvement, is not 'excessively rare'.
Hannedouchc a al,' reviewed 57 published cases of sarcoid granulomatous interstitial nephritis including six of their own. Eighteen patients, nearly one-third, had associated sarcoid eye disease. Many cases go unreported", It is curious that the paper Shah and colleagues quote as the only one describing the association of eye and renal involvement in sarcoidosis clearly states in the summary that sarcoidosis was excluded. Rosenbaum! describes five cases (not four) of a condition unrelated to sarcoidosis, tubule-interstitial nephritis and uveitis, where the interstitial nephritis is not granulomatous.
Cyclophosphamide, as used in Shah's patient with serious consequences, is a lifesaving drug in Wegener's granulomatosis but entirely inappropriate in sarcoidosis.
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